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Abstract—In this work, we consider a K-user Gaussian wiretap
multiple-access channel (GW-MAC) in which each transmitter
has an independent confidential message for the receiver. There
is also an external eavesdropper who intercepts the commu-
nications. The goal is to transmit the messages reliably while
keeping them confidential from the eavesdropper. To accomplish
this goal, two different approaches have been proposed in prior
works, namely, i.i.d. Gaussian random coding and real alignment.
However, the former approach fails at moderate and high SNR
regimes as its achievable result does not grow with SNR. On
the other hand, while the latter approach gives a promising
result at the infinite SNR regime, its extension to the finite-
SNR regime is a challenging task. To fill the gap between the
performance of the existing approaches, in this work, we establish
a new scheme in which, at the receiver’s side, it utilizes an
extension of the compute-and-forward decoding strategy and at
the transmitters’ side it exploits lattice alignment, cooperative
jamming, and i.i.d. random codes. For the proposed scheme, we
derive a new achievable bound on sum secure rate which scales
with log(SNR) and hence it outperforms the i.i.d. Gaussian codes
in moderate and high SNR regimes. We evaluate the performance
of our scheme, both theoretically and numerically. Furthermore,
we show that our sum secure rate achieves the optimal sum
secure degrees of freedom in the infinite-SNR regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been shown that structured codes outperform the
standard random codes in certain communication scenarios
with and without security constraints such as [1], [2], [3],
and [4]. For instance, a scheme based on real alignment was
proposed in [2] for the K-user Gaussian wiretap multiple-
access channel (GW-MAC). They used alignment to con-
fuse the eavesdropper and showed that in the infinite SNR
regime, their scheme improves over the result achieved by
Gaussian i.i.d. random codes in [5]. Also, Xie et al. in [3]
employed the real alignment technique in conjunction with
cooperative jamming for the same channel model and showed
improvement over the former scheme in [2]. In particular,
the proposed scheme in [3] achieves the optimal sum secure
degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) for the K-user Gaussian wiretap
multiple-access channel. Additionally, using similar schemes,
they characterized the exact secure degrees of freedom for
Gaussian broadcast channel with multiple helpers as well as
sum secure degrees of freedom for the two-user interference
channel.
The aforementioned alignment schemes are limited to the
infinite SNR regime whereas their extension to the finite-SNR
regime is challenging. On the other hand, in [6], Ordentlich
et al. accommodated the finite-SNR regime analysis for the
K-user multiple-access channel (MAC) without security con-
straints. They proposed a lattice alignment scheme using the
compute-and-forward decoding strategy, introduced in [7], and
showed that their scheme achieves a sum rate, without security,
that is within a constant gap from K-user MAC sum capacity
and is valid for any finite value of SNR.
Also, very recently, a compute-and-forward based scheme
was proposed to handle the finite-SNR regime for the K-user
Gaussian wiretap multiple-access channel [8]. A lower bound
on the sum secure rate was derived, which achieved K−1
K
sum
secure degrees of freedom. This was the first scheme on GW-
MAC that achieved a positive s.d.o.f and yet it worked at
finite-SNR regime.
In this paper, in light of the work in [3], we further improve
upon [8] such that our new achievable sum secure rate reaches
the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom, i.e., K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 , in
the infinite-SNR regime and yet improves over i.i.d. Gaussian
random codes in the moderate and high SNR regimes. It also
surpasses the result in [8] in high SNR regimes. We propose
a new scheme which consists of two layers in its encoding
strategy: the inner layer and the outer layer. Transmitters
incorporate a nested lattice structure as well as cooperative
jamming signals in their inner layers and i.i.d. random codes in
their outer layers. Also, in our decoding strategy, the receiver
exploits a new extension of the compute-and-forward decoding
strategy. We characterize a lower bound on the sum secure
rate for the K-user Gaussian wiretap multiple access channel
which is valid for any finite value of SNR and is in agreement
with the result in [3] in the infinite-SNR regime. Moreover, we
evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme numerically
for a three-user GW-MAC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
the system model is defined. Section III is devoted to our main
results. The achievability scheme and analysis of security are
presented in Section IV. Section V provides the numerical
results. The paper is concluded in Section VI. Finally, com-
plementary proofs are provided in Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the problem of secure and reliable commu-
nication over a multiple-access channel with K users at the
presence of an external eavesdropper. The system is modeled
by
y =
K∑
ℓ=1
hℓxℓ + z, yE =
K∑
ℓ=1
gℓxℓ + zE (1)
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z
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Fig. 1: The Gaussian wiretap multiple-access channel model.
Where xℓ is user ℓ’s channel input with a block length
of N . Vectors y and yE are the channel outputs at the
receiver and the eavesdropper sides, respectively. The real-
valued elements hℓ and gℓ are the channel gains from user
ℓ to the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively; thus,
vectors h , [h1, . . . , hK ]T and g , [g1, . . . , gK ]T are the
channel gain vectors. We assume that the transmitters1 know
the channel states, i.e., the channel gain vectors, in advance.
Finally, the random vectors z and zE are, respectively, the
receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s channel noises which are
independent and each is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and
normalized variance.
As it is shown in Figure 1, user ℓ has an independent
confidential message Wℓ which is uniformly distributed over
the set {1, . . . , 2NRℓ}, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. User ℓ maps its
message to the codeword xℓ through a stochastic encoder, i.e.,
xℓ = Eℓ(Wℓ). Also, there are power constraints on the channel
inputs as ‖xℓ‖2 ≤ NP , for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. There is also
a decoder D at the receiver side that estimates the transmitted
messages, i.e., D(y) = {Wˆℓ}Kℓ=1.
Definition 1 (Achievable sum secure rate): For the K-user
GW-MAC, a sum secure rate
∑K
ℓ=1Rℓ is achievable, if for
any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large N , there exist a sequence of
encoders {Eℓ}Kℓ=1 and a decoder D such that:
Prob
(
K⋃
ℓ=1
{Wˆℓ 6=Wℓ}
)
< ǫ (2)
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ ≤
1
N
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK |yE) + ǫ (3)
We refer to inequalities (2) and (3) as the reliability and
the weak secrecy constraints, respectively. Note that the sum
secure capacity is the supremum over all the achievable sum
secure rates.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In our achievability scheme, we develop a new decoding
strategy for K-user GW-MAC, which extends the one used
in [6], to comply with our encoding strategy. In our setting,
the receiver decodes K(K−1)+1 equations whose coefficient
1In our scheme, knowledge of the channel state is not beneficiary either to
the receiver or the eavesdropper.
vectors are integer valued and are linearly independent, then
it solves the system of the equations for the transmitted
messages. We denote the optimal rates at which the receiver
can successfully decode the equations by the set of rates
Rcomb,k, ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K(K−1)+1} and we refer to them as
equation rates or integer combination rates. The rates Rcomb,k
are computed in Section IV.
The following theorem is our main result.
Theorem 1: A sum secure rate
∑K
ℓ=1Rℓ is achievable if it
satisfies the following inequality
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ <
K(K−1)+1∑
k=2
Rcomb,k−
1
2
K∑
ℓ=1
log
(∑K
j=1,j 6=ℓ γ
2
j,ℓPj,ℓ + γ
2
ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
γ2ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
)
(4)
such that, for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the following holds.
γ(ℓ,i) =
gℓhi
gi
∀i 6= ℓ, (5)
γ(ℓ,ℓ) = hℓ (6)
and
K∑
i=1
Pℓ,i ≤ P, Pℓ,i > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (7)
Note that the achievable bound in (4) is a function of co-
efficients Pℓ,i, hence the supremum over all choices of Pℓ,i
satisfying (7) is also achievable.
Remark 1: The sum rate
∑K(K−1)+1
k=1 Rcomb,k in our
scheme is different from the sum rate achieved by [6] for the
K-user Gaussian MAC capacity2. However, we show that our
achievable sum rate reaches the performance of the compute-
and-forward framework in [6], asymptotically. In other words,
we show that
∑K(K−1)+1
k=1 Rcomb,k is within a constant gap
from K-user Gaussian MAC capacity. The proof is provided
in Appendix-A. Also, we will verify this claim by a numerical
experiment in Section V.
Corollary 1: The achievable sum secure rate in (4) grows
with log(SNR), i.e.,
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ ∝ log(P) (8)
Remark 2: The importance of Corollary 1 becomes clear
when its result is compared with the performance of
sum secure rate provided by i.i.d. Gaussian random codes
in [5]. Recall that the latter achieves a sum secure rate of
1
2 log(
1+‖h‖2P
1+‖g‖2P ) for the K-user GW-MAC. Hence, the security
performance of the scheme in [5] does not grow by increasing
the power3.
2We refer to the sum of non-secure rate as sum rate.
3Assuming the channel gain vector norms are of similar orders.
Corollary 2: The sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.)
achieved by our scheme is
lim
P→∞
∑
ℓRℓ
1
2 log (1 + P )
=
K(K − 1)
K(K − 1) + 1
(9)
Remark 3: Recall that in [3] it is shown that the optimal
sum secure degrees of freedom for the K-user Gaussian
wiretap MAC is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 . Hence, our achievable result in (4)
is asymptotically optimal.
Next section provides the achievability scheme and the
security analysis.
IV. THE ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME AND ANALYSIS OF
SECURITY
In this section, we introduce our new scheme. First, we
describe the codebook construction and encoding strategy
applied by the transmitters and then we unfold the decoding
strategy used by the receiver. Finally, the proof of weak
secrecy of the proposed scheme is presented. (Note: Proofs
for Corollary 1 and 2 are given in Appendix.
Codebook construction and encoding strategy
In order to send the confidential messages {Wℓ}Kℓ=1, each
user (transmitter) utilizes (K − 1) sub-codewords to encode
its own confidential message. Moreover, each user employs an
additional sub-codeword as a jamming signal which does not
carry any information regarding the confidential messages. We
proceed with describing the operations done by user ℓ, other
users perform similarly.
User ℓ picks K n-dimensional coarse and fine lattice pairs
as (Λf,(ℓ,i),Λ(ℓ,i)) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The set of lattices
used by all users form a nested structure in which the following
two conditions hold.
Λ(j,ℓ) ⊆ Λ(ℓ,ℓ), Λf,(j,ℓ) ⊆ Λf,(ℓ,ℓ) ∀ j 6= ℓ (10)
The fundamental Voronoi region of the coarse lattice Λ(ℓ,i) is
denoted by V(ℓ,i). For each i, the centers of the translations of
the fine lattice Λf,(ℓ,i) (cosets) lying in V(ℓ,i) are considered as
the realizations of the random vector tℓ,i. The second moment
of the coarse lattice Λ(ℓ,i) is set as γ2(ℓ,i)Pℓ,i.
Define the set L(ℓ,i) , {tℓ,i|tℓ,i ∈ V(ℓ,i)}. Assume that
vectors tℓ,i have a probability distribution P (tℓ,i) over the set
L(ℓ,i). The set L(ℓ,i) is termed the inner sub-codebook i used
by user ℓ.
Consider a one-to-one mapping φ : {1, . . . ,K} ×
{1, . . . ,K}\{(ℓ, ℓ)|ℓ ∈ [1,K]} → {2, . . . ,K(K − 1) + 1}.
Then, the ratio between the coarse lattice Λ(ℓ,i) and its
associated fine lattice is set such that Rcomb,k = 1n log(|L(ℓ,i)|)
where k = φ(ℓ, i) for all i 6= ℓ and k = 1 for i = ℓ.
Next, user ℓ generates B independent copies of vectors tℓ,i
according to distribution P (tℓ,i) to make one realization of
the outer codewords t¯ℓ,i. As a result, the block length of the
generated outer codeword is N , n × B. User ℓ performs
this procedure 2NRcomb,(ℓ,i) times to construct its outer sub-
codebook i, i.e., C(ℓ,i). User ℓ generates all its other sub-
codebooks, similarly. It is worth to mention that the i.i.d.
Wℓ {Wℓ,i}
K
i=1
i6=ℓ
Eℓ
Jamming signal
{t¯ℓ,i}
K
i=1+
{d¯ℓ,i}
K
i=1
mod {x˜ℓ,i}
K
i=1
{x˜ℓ,i}
K
i=1 ×
1
γℓ,i
{xℓ,i}
K
i=1
∑
i
xℓ
Figure 2(a): Encoder ℓ.
y ×
βMSE
Dither
subtraction mod
Lattice
qunatization vˆk
Figure 2(b): The Decoder.
Fig. 2: Our achievable scheme.
repetition of the inner codebook is added to the scheme so
that we can benefit from Packing Lemma in the proof of weak
secrecy4.
In the next step, similar to the Wyner random partitioning
in [9], the outer codewords of each sub-codebook (ℓ, i), for
all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and i 6= ℓ, are randomly partitioned into
2NRℓ,i bins of equal sizes. Note that the non-negative rates
Rℓ,i are chosen by user ℓ such that
∑
i6=ℓRℓ,i = Rℓ. The
partition index is characterized by a random variable Wℓ,i in
the corresponding sub-codebook. To encode the confidential
message Wℓ with its realizations wℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 2NRℓ}, user ℓ
divides its message into (K − 1) mutually independent sub-
messages Wℓ,i with the corresponding realizations wℓ,i. For
the sub-message i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}\ℓ, the user picks randomly
a codeword t¯ℓ,i from the partition wℓ,i in the sub-codebook
C(ℓ,i)
5
. Then, it adds a random dither vector d¯ℓ,i to the selected
codeword6 and reduces the sum modulo the coarse lattice
Λ(ℓ,i). Keep in mind that dithers are independent of all other
variables and are public.
The modular operation is done for each block of size n and
the outcomes of all B blocks are concatenated together. We
have:
x˜ℓ,i ,
([
t¯ℓ,i + d¯ℓ,i
]
mod Λ(ℓ,i)
) (11)
At the end, the resulting codeword is scaled by 1
γ(ℓ,i)
. In short,
the N -length codeword xℓ,i is constructed as
xℓ,i ,
1
γ(ℓ,i)
([
t¯ℓ,i + d¯ℓ,i
]
mod Λ(ℓ,i)
) (12)
The scaling factors γ(ℓ,i) are defined in (5) and (6).
In addition, the jamming codeword t¯ℓ,ℓ is chosen uniformly
at random from the sub-codebook C(ℓ,ℓ). The codeword xℓ,ℓ is
constructed similarly. Eventually, the superposition codeword
xℓ ,
∑K
i=1 xℓ,i is transmitted through the channel by user ℓ.
This procedure is displayed in Figure 2(a).
4Recall that proof of Packing Lemma is followed from jointly typicality
lemma on i.i.d. random sequences.
5Once the assignment of the sub-messages to codewords is done, it will be
fixed and provided to all parties.
6Each n-length block of the dither d¯(ℓ,i) is uniformly distributed over
V(ℓ,i).
Decoding strategy
Recall that the scaling factors γℓ,ℓ, ∀ℓ, are chosen such that
the users’ jamming codewords x˜ℓ,ℓ get aligned at the receiver’s
side and form a single lattice codeword
∑
ℓ x˜ℓ,ℓ. Thus, the
receiver observes
y =
∑
ℓ
∑
i
i6=ℓ
hℓgi
gℓhi
([
t¯ℓ,i + d¯ℓ,i
]
mod Λ(ℓ,i)
)
+
∑
ℓ
[
t¯ℓ,ℓ + d¯ℓ,ℓ
]
mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ), (13)
Extending the compute-and-forward decoding strategy in [7]
to K(K − 1)+ 1 integer combinations, the receiver estimates
the sub-messages codewords t¯ℓ,i by decoding K(K − 1) + 1
linearly independent equations whose coefficients are integer
valued. Equation k is denoted by vk and it’s defined as
vk,

a(k)1 ∑
ℓ
t¯ℓ,ℓ+
∑
(ℓ,i)
(ℓ 6=i)
a
(k)
ℓ,i t¯ℓ,i

 modΛ, (14)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K(K − 1) + 1}. Thus, the integer
coefficients vector for equation k is a (K(K − 1) + 1) × 1
vector a(k).
To decode equation vk , the receiver scales its observation
y by a factor of β and then it subtracts the dithers off, finally
it reduces the result modulo lattice Λ. It is worth mentioning
that Λ is the coarsest lattice among all the previously defined
lattice sets. The decoding procedure is depicted in Figure 2(b).
We have
sk=

βy−∑
(ℓ,i)
i6=ℓ
a
(k)
ℓ,i d¯ℓ,i−a
(k)
1
∑
ℓ
d¯ℓ,ℓ

 modΛ
=

∑
(ℓ,i)
i6=ℓ
a
(k)
ℓ,i γℓ,ixℓ,i+a
(k)
1
∑
ℓ
γℓ,ℓxℓ,ℓ−
∑
(ℓ,i)
i6=ℓ
a
(k)
ℓ,i d¯ℓ,i
−a
(k)
1
∑
ℓ
d¯ℓ,ℓ+zeff,k(h,~γ,a
(k),β)
]
modΛ
=
[
vk + zeff,k(h, ~γ, a
(k), β)
]
mod Λ (15)
Where ~γ is the vector of the scaling factors and zeff,k repre-
sents the effective noise defined as
zeff,k(h,~γ,a
(k),β),(β−a
(k)
1 )
∑
ℓ
γℓ,ℓxℓ,ℓ
+
∑
(ℓ,i)
i6=ℓ
(βhℓ − a
(k)
ℓ,i γℓ,i)xℓ,i + βz (16)
Thus, the effective noise variance is given as
σ2eff,k = ‖βh˜− Γ.a
(k)‖2P + β2 (17)
h˜ is a (K(K − 1) + 1)× 1 vector defined as
h˜ , [1, h1, . . . , h1︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−1
, h2, . . . , h2︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−1
, . . . . . . , hK , . . . , hK︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−1
]T (18)
Γ is a (K(K − 1) + 1) × (K(K − 1) + 1) diagonal matrix
such that:
Γ(1, 1) =
√∑K
ℓ=1 γ
2
ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
P
(19)
and for k > 2
Γ(k, k) =
√
γ2ℓ,iPℓ,i
P
s.t. k = φ(ℓ, i) (20)
It can be shown that the minimizer of the effective noise vari-
ance with respect to β is the MSE factor in linear estimation of
a
(k)
1
∑
ℓ γℓ,ℓxℓ,ℓ+
∑
(ℓ,i)
i6=ℓ
a
(k)
ℓ,i γℓ,ixℓ,i from vector y. Therefore,
substituting the optimal β in equation (17) yields
σ2eff,k(h, ~γ, a
(k)) = ‖F.a(k)‖2 (21)
Where the dot operation is the matrix-vector product and
matrix F is given as
F ,
( 1
P
Γ−2 + h˜h˜T
)−1
2 .Γ (22)
Note that among the lattice codewords participating in
equation vk, the one constructed on the densest lattice can be
recovered by decoding the equation vk. The receiver decodes
upon receiving each n-length block and concatenates the block
estimates at the end to get an estimate of the transmitted outer
codeword. Consider a k > 2 and assume that lattice Λf,(ℓ,i)
is the densest lattice participating in vk. In fact, mapping φ
is deduced from this step, i.e., k = φ(ℓ, i). Subsequently,
the receiver estimates the corresponding codeword t¯ℓ,i by
decoding the equation vk as
vˆk =
[
Qf,(ℓ,i)(sk)
]
mod Λ (23)
Where QΛ(.) is the nearest neighbor qunatizer associated with
lattice Λ. From (23), it can be seen that the probability of
decoding equation vk with error is upper-bounded as
Prob(vˆk 6= vk) = Prob(zeff,k /∈ V(ℓ,i))
Consequently, based on arguments similar to those in The-
orem 2 in [6], it can be shown that for sufficiently high
dimensional lattices, the decoding error probability can be
chosen smaller than ǫ, for any arbitrary ǫ > 0, provided that
Rcomb,k <
1
2
log
(
γ2(ℓ,i)Pℓ,i
σ2eff,k
)
s.t. φ(ℓ, i) = k, k 6= 1 (24)
and
Rcomb,1 < max
ℓ
(
1
2
log
(
γ2(ℓ,ℓ)Pℓ,ℓ
σ2eff,1
))
(25)
Finally, recall that by Theorem 1, the achievable sum secure
rate must satisfy in
∑K
ℓ=1Rℓ <
∑K(K−1)+1
k=2 Rcomb,k; there-
fore we have
Prob
(
K⋃
ℓ=1
{Wˆℓ 6=Wℓ}
)
< ǫ
Proof of weak secrecy
Base on our scheme, the eavesdropper observes the se-
quence yE as
yE =
K∑
ℓ=1
K∑
i=1
i6=ℓ
gi
hi
([
t¯ℓ,i + d¯ℓ,i
]
mod Λ(ℓ,i)
)
+
K∑
ℓ=1
(
gℓ
hℓ
[
t¯ℓ,ℓ + d¯ℓ,ℓ
]
mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ)
)
+ zE (26)
Define a sequence of vectors y(1)E , . . . ,y
(K)
E where
y
(ℓ)
E ,
K∑
j=1
j 6=ℓ
([
t¯jℓ + d¯j,ℓ
]
mod Λ(j,ℓ)
)
+
([
t¯ℓ,ℓ + d¯ℓ,ℓ
]
mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ)
) (27)
Note that
1
N
H(W1,...,WK
∣∣yE)≥ 1
N
H(W1,...,WK
∣∣y(1)E ,...,y(K)E ).
First, we show that the following sum secure rate provides
weak secrecy.
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ=
1
N
H
(
t¯1,1,t¯1,2,...,t¯K−1,K ,t¯K,K
∣∣y(1)E ,...,y(K)E ,D)+ǫ1
(28)
In which ǫ1 > 0 goes to zero as N →∞ and D is defined as
D , {d¯ℓ,i}(ℓ,i). We have
1
N
I(W1, . . . ,WK ;yE |D) ≤
1
N
H(W1,...,WK |D)−
1
N
H(W1,...,WK |y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E ,D)
=
1
N
H(W1,...,WK)−
1
N
H(W1,...,WK |y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E ,D)
=
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ−
1
N
H(W1,...,WK |y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E ,D) (29)
Next, we bound the second term in (29).
1
N
H(W1, . . . ,WK |y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E , D)
=
1
N
H(W1,...,WK ,y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D)−
1
N
H(y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D)
(a)
≥
1
N
H(t¯1,2, . . . , t¯ℓ−1,ℓ, t¯ℓ+1,ℓ, . . . , t¯K,K−1,y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E |D)
−
1
N
H(y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E |D)
−
1
N
H(t¯1,2,...,t¯ℓ−1,ℓ,t¯ℓ+1,ℓ,...,t¯K,K−1|y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E ,W1,...,WK ,D)
(b)
≥
1
N
H(t¯1,2,...,t¯ℓ−1,ℓ,t¯ℓ+1,ℓ,...,t¯K,K−1,y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D)
−
1
N
H(y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E |D)− 2ǫ2
(c)
=
1
N
H(t¯1,2,...,t¯K,K−1)−
1
N
H(y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D)−2ǫ2
+
1
N
H(y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E |D, t¯1,2, . . . , t¯K,K−1) (30)
Where inequality (a) comes from the chain rule. Note that
in the sequence of t¯1,2, . . . , t¯K,K−1, the indices i = ℓ are
excluded. Soundness of inequality (b) is shown in Lemma 1
in Appendix. In short, it comes from applying Packing Lemma
to the outer codewords which have a random i.i.d. structure.
Equality (c) is due to chain rule.
By substituting (30) into (29), we get
1
N
I(W1, . . . ,WK ;yE |D) ≤
1
N
H
(
t¯1,1,...,¯tK,K
∣∣y(1)E ,...,y(K)E ,D)− 1NH(t¯1,2,...,¯tK,K−1)
+
1
N
H(y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D)−
1
N
H(y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D,¯t1,2,...,¯tK,K−1)
+ 2ǫ2 + ǫ1
=
1
N
H(t¯1,2,...,¯tK,K−1,y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E |D)
−
1
N
H(t¯1,2, . . . , t¯K,K−1,y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E |D) + 2ǫ2 + ǫ1
= 2ǫ2 + ǫ1 (31)
In which ǫ2 and ǫ1 tend to zero for sufficiently large N .
Therefore, the sum secure rate in (28) provides weak secrecy;
thus any sum secure rate satisfying
K∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ ≤
1
N
H
(
t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K
∣∣y(1)E , . . . ,y(K)E , D)+ ǫ1
(32)
is also achievable with weak secrecy. Hence, we only need to
show that the sum secure rate in (4) is a lower bound on (28).
We have
1
N
H
(
t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K
∣∣y(1)E , . . . ,y(K)E , D)+ ǫ1
≥
1
N
H(t¯1,1,...,t¯K,K)−
1
N
H
(
y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E
∣∣D)+ǫ1
=
1
N
H (t¯1,2, . . . , t¯K,K−1) +
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H (t¯ℓ,ℓ)
−
1
N
H
(
y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E
∣∣D)+ ǫ1
=
K(K−1)+1∑
k=2
Rcomb,k+
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H(t¯ℓ,ℓ) (33)
−
1
N
H
(
y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E
∣∣D)+ ǫ1 (34)
Next, we bound the first term in (34). We have
1
N
H(y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E
∣∣D) ≤ K∑
ℓ=1
1
N
H(y
(ℓ)
E |D)
=
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
([
y
(ℓ)
E
]
mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ), QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
∣∣D)
≤
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
([
y
(ℓ)
E
]
mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ)
∣∣d¯ℓ,ℓ, D\{d¯ℓ,ℓ})
+
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
)
=
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H



t¯ℓ,ℓ+∑
j 6=ℓ
[
t¯j,ℓ+d¯j,ℓ
]
modΛ(j,ℓ)

modΛ(ℓ,ℓ)
∣∣∣∣∣D


+
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
)
=
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H



t¯ℓ,ℓ+∑
j 6=ℓ
t¯j,ℓ−
∑
j 6=ℓ
QΛ(j,ℓ)(t¯j,ℓ+d¯j,ℓ)

modΛ(ℓ,ℓ)
∣∣∣∣∣D


+
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
)
(d)
=
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
[t¯ℓ,ℓ+q¯ℓ] modΛ(ℓ,ℓ)
)
+
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
)
(e)
=
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
[t¯ℓ,ℓ] mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ)
)
+
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
)
=
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H(t¯ℓ,ℓ) +
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H
(
QΛ(ℓ,ℓ)(y
(ℓ)
E )
)
(f)
≤
1
N
K∑
ℓ=1
H(t¯ℓ,ℓ)
+
1
2
K∑
ℓ=1
log
(∑K
j=1,j 6=ℓγ
2
j,ℓPj,ℓ+γ
2
ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
γ2ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
)
+δ(ǫ) (35)
Where in equality (d), the random vector q¯ℓ has been defined
as
q¯ℓ ,

∑
j 6=ℓ
t¯j,ℓ −
∑
j 6=ℓ
QΛ(j,ℓ)(t¯j,ℓ + d¯j,ℓ)

 mod Λ(ℓ,ℓ) (36)
Furthermore, equality (e) comes from conditions in (10) along
with the Crypto Lemma [Lemma 2, [10]] in which the compact
group satisfying in the lemma’s conditions is the set Lℓ,ℓ =
Λf(,ℓ,ℓ)∩V(ℓ,ℓ). Lastly, inequality (f) is deduced from Lemma 1
in [8]. Here γj,i is defined as in (5) and (6).
Consequently, expressions (33), (34), and (35) yield
1
N
H
(
t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K
∣∣y(1)E , . . . ,y(K)E , D)+ ǫ1
≥
K(K−1)+1∑
k=2
Rcomb,k
−
1
2
K∑
ℓ=1
log
(∑K
j=1,j 6=ℓ γ
2
j,ℓPj,ℓ + γ
2
ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
γ2ℓ,ℓPℓ,ℓ
)
− δ(ǫ) + ǫ1
In which ǫ1 and δ(ǫ) tend to zero for sufficiently large N .
This completes the proof of weak secrecy of Theorem 1. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme numerically. To this end, we compute our achievable
results with and without security for a three-user Gaussian
wiretap MAC and then compare the achievable sum secure rate
with the result implied by i.i.d. Gaussian random codes in [5]
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Fig. 3: Achievable sum rate, with and without security evaluated
for a three-user Gaussian wiretap MAC at different SNR.
as well as the result in [8]. Furthermore, we show experimen-
tally that our achievable sum rate, i.e.,
∑K(K−1)+1
k=1 Rcomb,k
reaches Gaussian MAC capacity in high-SNR regimes.
In the first experiment, we compare our sum secure rate
with the one achieved by i.i.d. Gaussian random codes. To
this end, we have considered a Three-user GW-MAC in which
the channel gain vectors, h, g, were chosen as realizations of
i.i.d. normal distributions. The simulation was run for 1000
instances and the average sum rates are shown as a function
of SNR in Figure 3.
For simplicity, in implementing the achievable result of our
scheme, we allocated powers among sub-message codewords
equally, i.e., for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} we set Pℓ,i = PK , ∀ i.
Due to this simplification, the sum secure rate displayed as
our achievable result in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are lower
bounds on the highest sum secure rate that can be achieved
by (4). Also, similar to [6], we have approximated the best
integer coefficient vectors a(k) for all equations using the LLL
reduction algorithm which forms a set of K(K−1)+1 linearly
independent lattice vectors [11].
A comparison between the curve displayed as our achiev-
able sum secure rate and the one related to the achievable sum
secure rate offered by i.i.d. Gaussian random codes reveals
the advantage of our scheme versus pure random coding in
moderate and high SNR regimes. Moreover, to shed light on
the performance of our decoding strategy, we plotted the sum
of the integer combinations rates, i.e.,
∑
k Rcomb,k as well.
As it can be seen, our achievable sum rate (without security)
reaches Gaussian MAC capacity in the high SNR regimes.
Recall that the compute-and-forward decoding strategy in [6]
offers a lower bound on sum rate that achieves MAC sum
capacity within a constant gap. Figure 3 shows numerically
that our extension to their decoding strategy yields the same
performance in terms of the achievable sum rate without
security.
Also, Figure 4 illustrates the advantage of our new scheme
over the one in [8]. The improvement can be clearly seen
in high SNR regimes. This result is expected as the sum
secure degrees of freedom achieved by our new scheme is
higher than the one achieved by [8]. Note that due to the
sub-optimal power allocation considered in the numerical
implementation, the red curve displayed in Figure 4 is a
lower bound on the maximum sum secure rate that can be
achieved by our proposed scheme. Therefore, given the fact
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Fig. 4: Achievable sum secure rate for a three-user Gaussian
wiretap MAC at different SNR.
that the average slope of the red curve is much bigger than
for the blue curve, our achievable sum secure rate under the
optimal power allocation crosses the blue curve at lower SNR
values. Furthermore, the location of the crossing point is also
dependent on the number of users.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the K-user Gaussian wiretap
multiple-access channel. We developed a new scheme based
on an extension of the compute-and-forward decoding strategy,
nested lattice structure, and cooperative jamming. Our scheme
consists of two layers: the inner layer which is the nested
lattice coding structure and the outer layer which is the random
coding. In short, our scheme achieves weak secrecy by means
of three factors including proper lattice alignment, cooperative
jamming signals, and i.i.d. repetitions of lattice codebook.
Note that the latter has been added only to prove weak secrecy
for the finite-SNR regime. Furthermore, we derived a new
lower bound on sum secure rate for the finite-SNR regime
based on our scheme and showed that it achieves the optimal
sum secure degrees of freedom.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Corollary 1
We begin the proof by showing that
∑K(K−1)+1
k=1 Rcomb,k
scales with log(P ). We have
K(K−1)+1∑
k=1
Rcomb,k =
K(K−1)+1∑
k=1
1
2
log
(
Γ(k, k)2P
‖F.a(k)‖2
)
=
K(K − 1) + 1
2
log(P ) +
1
2
log
(∏
k
Γ(k, k)2
)
−
1
2
log
(∏
k
‖F.a(k)‖2
)
(a)
≥
K(K − 1) + 1
2
log(P ) +
1
2
log
(∏
k
Γ(k, k)2
)
−
1
2
log
(
(K(K − 1) + 1)(K(K−1)+1).| det(F)|2
)
=
K(K − 1) + 1
2
log(P ) +
1
2
log
(∏
k
Γ(k, k)2
)
−(K(K − 1) + 1)
1
2
log (K(K − 1) + 1)
−
1
2
log
(∏
k
Γ(k, k)2
)
−
1
2
log
(
det
(
1
P
Γ−2 + h˜h˜T
))
=
K(K−1)+1
2
log(P )−(K(K−1)+1)
1
2
log(K(K−1)+1)
−
1
2
log
(
det
(
Γ−1(
1
P
I+ Γh˜h˜TΓ)Γ−1
))
=
K(K−1)+1
2
log(P )−(K(K−1)+1)
1
2
log(K(K−1)+1)
−
1
2
log
(
det
(
Γ−2
))
−
1
2
log
(
det
(
1
P
I+ Γh˜h˜TΓ
))
(b)
=
K(K − 1) + 1
2
log(P )−
1
2
log
(
PK(K−1)+1
1 + ‖Γ.h˜‖2P
)
−(K(K − 1) + 1)
1
2
log (K(K − 1) + 1)−
1
2
log
(
det
(
Γ−2
))
=
1
2
log
(
1+‖Γ.h˜‖2P
)
−
1
2
log
(
det
(
Γ−2
))
−(K(K − 1) + 1)
1
2
log (K(K − 1) + 1) (37)
In the above arguments, inequality (a) is concluded from
Minkowski Theorem in [6] and equality (b) is the result of
applying Sylvester’s determinant identity (refer e.g. to [12]).
Note that from (37) two points can be deduced: First, our
achievable sum rate (without security) is within a constant
gap (with respect to P ) from K-user MAC sum capacity7 and
second,
∑K(K−1)+1
k=1 Rcomb,k∝log(P ). Now, using Corollary 5
in [6], for large enough P , we have
Rcomb,k ≤
1
K(K − 1) + 1
log(P ) ∀k (38)
As a result, (37) and (38) together yield∑K(K−1)+1
k=2 Rcomb,k ∝ log(P ). This completes the proof of
Corollary 1. 
B. Proof of Corollary 2
We derive the sum secure degrees of freedom in two steps.
In step one, we show that the limit of the first term in (4)
when P → ∞ is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 . As it was mentioned earlier,
the jamming codewords get aligned at the receiver’s side and
as a result, the receiver decodes K(K − 1) + 1 equations.
This situation is equivalent to the multiple-access channel with
K(K − 1)+ 1 users in which user one has the highest rate of
Rcomb,1 and other users operate at rates equal to Rcomb,k for
{2, . . . ,K(K− 1)+ 1}. Thus, similar to the arguments in the
proof of Corollary 1 and by using Corollary 5 in [6], we have
lim sup
P→∞
Rcomb,k
1
2 log(1 + P )
=
1
K(K − 1) + 1
, ∀ k (39)
Therefore,
limsup
P→∞

K(K−1)+1∑
k=2
Rcomb,k

= K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
(40)
Next, we show that the second term in (4) is a constant with
respect to the power P and hence it does not contribute to the
sum secure degrees of freedom. To this end, let us consider a
sub-optimal power allocation strategy in which user ℓ allocates
its total power equally among its sub-codewords, i.e., Pℓ,i =
P
K
, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Therefore, we have∑K
j=1,j 6=ℓ γ
2
(j,ℓ)P(j,ℓ) + γ
2
(ℓ,ℓ)Pℓ,ℓ
γ2(ℓ,ℓ)Pℓ,ℓ
=
K∑
j=1
j 6=ℓ
γ2(j,ℓ) + γ
2
(ℓ,ℓ)
γ2(ℓ,ℓ)
(41)
As a result, the second term in (4) is reduced to
1
2
∑K
ℓ=1 log
(∑K
j=1
j 6=ℓ
γ2(j,ℓ)+γ
2
(ℓ,ℓ)
γ2
(ℓ,ℓ)
)
, which is a constant with
respect to P , hence, the proof of Corollary 2 is completed.
C. Supplementary lemma
Lemma 1: For the achievable scheme presented in Section
VII, we have
1
nB
H(t¯1,2, . . . , t¯K,K−1|W1, . . . ,WK ,yE , D) ≤ 2ǫ2, (42)
where ǫ2 goes to zero if B is taken large enough.
7To see this clearly, choose γℓ,i = 1 and Pℓ,i = PK , for all i, ℓ.
Proof: We prove Lemma 1 by showing that
1
nB
H(t¯1,1, t¯1,2, . . . , t¯K,K |W1, . . . ,WK ,yE , D) ≤ 2ǫ2 (43)
Then, the correctness of Lemma 1 is automatically deduced.
Let us assume that for all (ℓ, i) ∈ {1, . . . ,K}×{1, . . . ,K}
each codeword t¯ℓ,i is uniquely identified with two indices
(wℓ,i, w
′
ℓ,i). The corresponding index variable for wℓ,i
is Wℓ,i, ∀i. Also, assume that H(wℓ,ℓ) = 0, ∀ℓ and
H({wℓ,i}
K
i=1,i6=ℓ) = H(Wℓ). Assume that 1 ≤ wℓ,i ≤ 2NRℓ,i
and 1 ≤ w′ℓ,i ≤ 2NR
′
ℓ,i , where N
∑
(ℓ,i)Rℓ,i =
N
∑
ℓRℓ = H
(
t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K
∣∣y(1)E , . . . ,y(K)E , D)+Nǫ1 and
N
∑
(ℓ,i)R
′
ℓ,i = I
(
t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K ;y
(1)
E , . . . ,y
(K)
E
∣∣D)−Nǫ1,
where ǫ1 > 0. Note that N
∑
(ℓ,i)(R
′
ℓ,i + Rℓ,i) =
H(t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K) = N
∑K(K−1)+1
k=1 Rcomb,k.
Having the bin indices (w1, . . . , wK), the eavesdropper
needs to look for the transmitted codewords in the
corresponding sub-codebooks (C1(w1), . . . , CK(wK)).
From the above setting, the number of codewords
t¯ℓ,i for the eavesdropper to check would be
2
B
(
I
(
t1,1,...,tK,K ;y
(1)
E,<n>
,...,y
(K)
E,<n>
∣∣d1,1,...,dK,K)−nǫ1)
, where
the subscript <n> denotes an n-length block of the
corresponding random vector. Among these remaining
codewords, the eavesdropper looks for those ones that satisfy
in the following condition.(
t¯1,1,...,¯tK,K ,y
(1)
E ,...,y
(K)
E ,D
)
∈T Bǫ2
(
P
t¯1,1,...,t¯K,K ,y
(1)
E
,...,y
(K)
E
|D
)
where T Bǫ2 (Pt¯1,1,...,t¯K,K ,y(1)E ,...,y(K)E |D) is the set of ǫ2-jointly
typical sequences. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that t¯1,1 = t¯∗1,1, ..., t¯K,K = t¯∗K,K are sent. For ease of
notation, define t¯∗K1 , (t¯∗1,1, . . . , t¯∗K,K). Then, a decoding
error would occur in either of the following two possible
events.
E1=
{(
t¯∗
K
1 ,yE ,d
K
1
)
6∈T Bǫ2 (Pt¯K1 ,yE|dK1 )
}
E2 =
{
∃
(
t¯K1 ,yE , D
)
∈ T Bǫ2 (Pt¯K1 ,yE|D) :
t¯K1 6= t¯
∗K
1 , tℓ ∈ Cℓ(wℓ), ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
}
By the AEP theorem, the first error event is bounded above
by ǫ2, and the second term can also be bounded by ap-
plying the Packing Lemma, [lemma 3.1, [13]] to codewords
t¯1,1, . . . , t¯K,K , i.e.,
P{E2}≤2
B
(
I
(
t1,1,...,tK,K ;y
(1)
E,<n>
,...,y
(K)
E,<n>
∣∣d1,1,...,dK,K)−nǫ1)
×2
−B
(
I
(
t1,1,...,tK,K ;y
(1)
E,<n>
,...,y
(K)
E,<n>
∣∣d1,1,...,dK,K)−δ(ǫ2))
≤ 2−B
(
nǫ1−δ(ǫ2)
)
,
where δ(ǫ2) tends to zero as ǫ2 goes to zero. Now, choose
nǫ1 ≥ δ(ǫ2). Hence, for sufficiently large B, the total proba-
bility of the error events will be upper-bounded as Pe ≤ 2ǫ2.
As a result, using Fano’s inequality in [13], the correctness of
(43) is concluded. 
